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LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS 
By RonaldM. Hershkowitz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Effective environmental protection may require increased local 
control through municipally enacted and administered ordinances. 
Municipalities, due to their proximity to the problem, are often 
best able to define the ecological dangers and effect the most 
equitable solutions in terms of a balance between local environ-
mental protection and the realities of municipal economics. There-
fore, local action should be recognized as an alternatize to both lack 
of action by, as well as a permissible supplement to existing pro-
grams of, the state and federal governments.1 
Recent environmental ordinances have sought to limit or pro-
hibit phosphates from detergents,2 tax non-biodegradable and non-
reusable containers,3 control smoke emissions4 and control local 
solid waste disposa1.5 Two basic legal issues arise concerning the 
ability of such measures to withstand judicial attack. First, munici-
pality must act in a manner consistent with the power delegated to 
it by the state.6 Second, assuming the municipality has acted within 
its delegated authority, the municipal legislation must also conform 
to state and federal constitutional standards. 
This article seeks to investigate the nature and extent of these 
two limitations to local action with respect to several recent cases. 
The same factual situation often raises both of these legal questions. 
Therefore, wherever possible, the same cases are used to illustrate 
different legal issues. 
II. MUNICIPAL POWER TO ENACT ENVIRONMENTAL ORDINANCES 
A . Municipal Power 
The threshold issue in assessing the validity of a local ordinance 
is whether the municipal corporation has the authority to legislate 
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in the particular area. It is fundamental that a municipal corpora-
tion is a government created by the state legislature, possessing 
enumerated powers only.7 It must act within the bounds of its 
delegated authority defined by constitutional provisions8 or legisla-
tive enactments.9 The purpose of delegating home rule authority is 
to provide municipalities with greater initiative in dealing with 
their own local affairs. Consistent with this purpose, environmental 
ordinances have generally been sustained against allegations of 
action beyond the scope of municipal authority.lO 
For example, in Ringlieb v. Township of Parsippany-Troy 
Hiils,ll the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
the Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills had the authority to regu-
late and control a sanitary landfill within its boundaries. The 
principal question, discussed infra/2 concerned a state-local govern-
ment conflict. The threshold right-of the township to enact such an 
ordinance, however, absent similar state action, was apparently 
recognized by the court as being provided by the New Jersey Con-
stitutionY Consistent with the principal of home rule, the New 
Jersey Constitution provides for a liberal construction of all laws 
in favor of municipal corporations, stating specifically that ". . . 
[IJocal government should be given every advantage to manage and 
operate its affairs."14 
Another example of a local ordinance, within the state's constitu-
tional grant to its municipalities, was litigated in Colgate Palmolive 
Co. v. Erie County.15 Here, the New York Supreme Court16 con-
sidered an Erie County ordinance which set timetables for the 
reduction and the eventual prohibition of phosphates from deter-
gents sold and used within the county.17 Again, the principal issue 
litigated was the relationship between the local enactment and state 
legislation. Aside from this issue of preemptive state action, how-
ever, the basic delegatory authority of the county to act was appar-
ently conceded. Colgate-Palmolive did not allege a lack of such 
authority, an allegation which would probably have been unsuc-
cessful. This is evidenced, in part, by the specific language of the 
New York State Constitution, which gives localities considerable 
powers of local legislation without resort to the state legislature.Is 
The granted powers, which are to be "liberally construed,"19 in-
clude the authority to pass local laws which relate to the " ... safety, 
health and well-being of persons ... "20 of the municipality. All such 
grants are conditioned on the lack of inconsistency between the local 
law and state constitutional or statutory law.21 The court, in re-
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sponse to plaintiff's claim of possible harm, recognized its obligation 
to consider the county's assertions of the injurious affects of phos-
phates on the health, safety and welfare of its inhabitants. 22 This 
recognition of local concern, coupled with the provisions of the 
state constitution, provided Erie County with its initial authority 
to control phosphates. The preemptive conflict itself is discussed 
infra. 23 
Allview Inn v. Howard County24 provides an example of munici-
pal authority emanating from legislative delegation. The Maryland 
Circuit Court for Howard County considered the legality of a 
county ordinance prohibiting the sale of "throwaway" bottles or 
containers for soft drinks, beer and malt liquors. 25 Plaintiffs con-
tended that the county lacked the power to regulate the sale of beer 
and malt liquors and that the alcoholic beverage field had been 
preempted by the state. As to the first contention-which went to 
the basic issue of county power absent state conflict-the plaintiffs 
relied on the specific language of the statute.26 Article 25A §5(S), 
allowed the county to pass any ordinance, not inconsistent with 
state law, as "deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good 
government, health and welfare of the county," and specifically 
prohibited legislation" ... with reference to licensing, regulating, 
prohibiting or submitting to local action, the manufacture or sale 
of malt or spiritous liquors." The county relied on §5(T) of the 
same article which gave counties the power "to enact local laws ... 
for the protection and promotion of public safety, health, morals, 
comfort and welfare relating to ... the disposal of waste .... " The 
issue of delegated authority, then, was whether the specific prohibi-
tion of §5(S) withheld some of the power seemingly delegated in 
§5(T). The court held that the Howard County action was not pro-
hibited in that the county council's purpose was not to prohibit or 
regulate the sale of malt or spiritous liquors, but rather to regulate 
the disposal of waste materiaJ.27 The second issue of prohibition is 
discussed and analyzed infra/8 in conjunction with state preemp-
tion, an issue also decided in favor of Howard County. The prin-
cipal point here, however, is that the county had the threshold 
authority to act. As with Ringlieb and Colgate-Palmolive, without 
first establishing this basic authority, the question of state preemp-
tion would never have been reached. 
The above cases give some indication of the broad interpretation 
given to home rule grants. However, delegatory authority brings 
with it limitations. These delegatory restrictions extend not only to 
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the subject matter of local concern, but also to the means of effect-
ing solutions to these concerns. Society of Plastics Industry v. New 
York City29 provides an example of municipal action in excess of its 
home rule police powers. New York City wanted to tax the sale of 
certain types of non-biodegradable containers. The New York 
State Constitution limits local legislative authority to the adoption 
of " ... all local laws not inconsistent with the consitution or any 
generallaws."3o It also grants all taxing power in New York State 
to the state legislature and provides that such taxing power may be 
delegated to municipalities only through laws which specifically 
designate the tax to be imposed.3l The power to tax, then, is not 
within the general police powers of the state's political subdivisions. 
Therefore, the city was required to obtain specific legislative per-
mission before it could impose its desired tax. The issues surround-
ing the request for specially delegated authority are discussed 
infra. 32 
B. State Preemption 
One limitation to municipal action is the constraint that munic-
ipal ordinances must not conflict with the general laws or constitu-
tion of the state.33 An ordinance found in conflict is considered void 
because enacted in excess of delegated municipal authority. 
In Ringlieb34 the principal issues raised in conjunction with state 
preemption were those of legislative intent and the need for state-
wide uniformity.35 The statute involved, the Solid Waste Manage-
ment Act, expressed legislative concern for the solid waste problem 
by calling for more stringent and realistic industrial regulations 
and recommended " ... the development and formulation of state-
wide, regional, county and inter-county plans for solid waste man-
agement."36 The township claimed that the state statute did not 
preclude the municipality from passing an ordinance regulating the 
same industry. Although the basis for this position is not clear from 
the court's opinion, one argument which the township might have 
asserted would revolve about the exclusion from the statute of the 
word "towns." The township could have argued that this exclusion 
had the effect of leaving towns unaffected by its provisions, and 
therefore that their waste management authority permitted by 
home rule was either completely unrestricted or, alternately, re-
stricted only by minimum state standards. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, noting the statutory language, 
held that the state statutes controlling the solid waste industry37 
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were so pervasive as to preempt the entire field and invalidate the 
township's ordinance regulating solid waste disposal and collec-
tion. 38 Specifically, the court asserted that" ... the State may with-
hold from, or grant a given power to a municipality ... " and that 
the " ... question of preemption must be determined, absent an 
express exclusion from the field by the State, by the Court's ascer-
taining the legislative intent."3fl Pursuant to that mandate, the 
court concluded that the locality had acted beyond the scope of its 
delegated powers in that no mention of the legislative concern 
below the intercounty level implied a legislative intent to bar 
localities from developing or formulating their own solid waste 
disposal controls. Therefore, it held that there " ... seems to be a 
comprehensive plan on the part of the state to control all facets of 
this [solid waste disposal] industry."4o 
Ringlieb was also based in part on the court's appraisal of the 
need for statewide uniformity. Allowing each municipality to regu-
late, maintain and control its own sanitary landfills-as specified 
in the Parsippany-Troy Hills ordinance-would, in the court's 
opinion, result in " ... conflicting ordinances and requirements of 
the separate municipalities [which] would bring to a complete halt 
the sanitary landfill operations in this state [and] the refuse disposal 
business, all to the detriment of the general health of the general 
public."41 The court based its finding on the factual determination 
that the ordinance resulted in considerable duplication and over-
lapping which would require duplication of efforts while serving 
no useful purpose. 
It is to be noted, however, that the Ringlieb court has not pre-
cluded all local action. In situations such as the one in Ringlieb, 
where the legislative intent is unclear, and the locality disagrees 
with the court's interpretation of that intent, the locality can always 
appeal to the legislature itself. Presumably, if the court misinter-
preted legislative intent, the legislature should be willing to amend 
the statute in question.42 This is precisely what occurred as an after-
math of Ringlieb. In response to the decision, the legislature 
amended the solid waste legislation to clarify its intention that the 
doctrine of preemption was not to apply.43 
Ringlieb may be contrasted with Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Erie 
County44 where the issue was one of express preemption. The New 
York Supreme Court was asked to determine the relationship be-
tween two enactments, one state and one county, both designed to 
initially limit, and then to prohibit, phosphates from detergents 
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used and sold within their respective jurisdictions. On March 16, 
1971, the Erie County legislature enacted an ordinance which 
limited the phosphorus content of detergents to 8.7% by weight if 
sold or used after April 30, 1971 and totally prohibited any phos-
phorus in detergents sold after January 1, 1972.45 Subsequent to 
that enactment, the state legislature imposed its own statewide 
controls on the sale and use of detergents containing phosphates, 
but subject to a different timetable. Under the State Environmental 
Conservation Law, the phosphorus content was restricted to 8.7% 
by weight after December 31, 1971, with a total ban taking effect 
on June 1, 1973.46 
Plaintiff, a manufacturer of detergents, sought through a prelimi-
nary injunction a declaration whether the local enactment was in 
conflict with the Environmental Conservation Law and, therefore, 
preempted and invalid. The two statutes were identical except that 
the state's compliance schedule was slower. The state preemption 
provision explicitly states that ". . . the state fully exercises the 
exclusive right to regulate and control ... ingredients ... [and 
that] [i]n order to assure statewide uniformity, such regulation and 
control by any political subdivision of the state of such products is 
prohibited on or after the effective date of this subdivision .... "47 
Based upon this statutory language, the county ordinance would 
have been held to have been preempted by the state. Both laws 
regulate the same subject matter in the same way. The legislative 
intent is explicitly stated. The county law, however was saved from 
invalidity solely as a result of the additional language in the En-
vironmental Conservation Law, which stated that " ... any such 
regulation and control in effect on [J une I, 1971] shall be unaffected 
by this subdivision."48 Colgate maintained that the total ban de-
creed by the County ordinance was invalid because it became 
operative after June 1, 1971, the first date of preemptive control. 
The court, however, disagreed and held that, by virtue of the fact 
that the Erie County ordinance was in effect on June I, 1971, even 
though only as to the 8.7% limit, the entire ordinance was to be 
given effect, including those provisions which became operative 
after June 1, 1971. Hence, the ordinance was upheld. However, 
any local legislation enacted subsequent to the deadline would be 
expressly preempted. 
Absent such express preemptive provisions, the mere existence 
of similar state and local enactments does not necessarily lead to a 
conflict. Allview Inn v. Howard County41l is indicative of the ability 
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of state and local governments to work concurrently for the common 
good.50 As discussed supra, the Howard County council prohibited 
the sale of "throw-away" bottles or containers for soft drinks, beer 
and malt liquors.51 Plaintiffs, sellers of such beverages in non-
returnable containers, asserted that the ordinance regulated beer 
and malt liquor sales and therefore was invalid as impinging upon 
the state's exclusive right to legislate in the area of alcoholic bever-
age control. Plaintiffs supported their contention with a state 
statute which prohibited counties from legislating " ... with refer-
ence to licensing, regulating, prohibiting or submitting to local 
option, the manufacture or sale of malt or spiritous liquors"52 and 
authorized the state Comptroller to adopt and publish rules and 
regulations regarding labelling, advertising and setting deposit 
rates on returnable beer containers.53 The county, on the other 
hand, relied on the state's enabling legislation in the area of solid 
waste disposa1.54 
The Allview Inn court held that while local regulations must 
yield to state legislation where there is a conflict, "[t]he mere fact 
that the state has legislated upon a particular subject does not neces-
sarily deprive the [locality] of its power to deal with the subject by 
[its own] ordinances. "55 The issue of whether the state and county 
acts were conflicting or concurrently applicable was held to depend 
upon the legislative intent and purpose, and not solely upon the 
literal statutory terms.56 Generally, a state law will not be construed 
as impliedly taking away existing local power unless there is evi-
denced a clear and unambiguous conflict between the purposes, 
effects or enforcement procedures of the respective measures. If a 
local ordinance and a state statute can be construed to give effect 
to both, the courts will do SO.57 As stated in the earlier discussion 
on delegated authority, the A llview Inn court determined that the 
county purpose was the regulation of waste disposal, not the pro-
hibition or regulation of malt or spiritous liquors. The court 
further found that the county action did not usurp the state's 
legislative power in the alcoholic beverage field, and that there was 
no conflict, in that the bill did not regulate deposits but merely 
forbade the sale of containers upon which a deposit is not charged. 
The A llview Inn court's reasoning has important applications in 
the environmental law area. State and local governments are often 
under similar pressures and exhibit similar concerns. Local govern-
ments may gain flexibility through local ordinances that are con-
sistent with state standards. However, the facts in Allview Inn may 
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distinguish it from other environmental situations. Not only was 
the intent of the couny ordinance different from that of the state 
law, but the effect of compliance with the statutes was also different. 
Even if prohibited from using throwaway containers, the liquor 
and beer industry could still operate, without county interference, 
and manufacture and sell liquor and beer. If beer could only be sold 
in throwaway bottles, the issues would be different. In such a case, 
it is submitted, a direct conflict with the state statute would be 
found and the local ordinance would be held to be preempted and 
invalid. 
C. Specific Enabling Legislation 
Society of Plastics Industry v. New York City58 is indicative of 
the dangers of exceeding the state's delegation of authority. New 
York City did not have the authority to tax the sale of non-biode-
gradable containers, the power to tax being explicitly reserved by 
the state.59 In the absence of general home rule authority, a munici-
pality can act only pursuant to a specific enabling act. Therefore, 
the city received special power to tax in this situation. The En-
abling Act authorized the city to impose " ... [tJaxes on the sale of 
containers made in whole or in part of rigid or semi-rigid paper 
board, fibre, glass, metal, plastic or any combination of such ma-
terial ... intended for use in packing or packaging any product 
intended for sale."60 The purpose of such authorization was to 
" ... promote the recycling of containers and reduce the cost of 
solid waste disposal. ... "61 The act allowed New York City to grant 
specific tax credits on the basis of percentages of recycled material.62 
Pursuant to this authorization, New York City passed an ordi-
nance which provided for a tax of two cents on the sale of every 
rigid or semi-rigid plastic container, and for an allowance of one 
cent for each taxable container that was manufactured with a min-
imum of 30% recycled material. 63 No taxes were levied on the 
other items listed in the state's enabling legislation. 
Many of the issues surrounding the scope of the delegation of 
authority involve statutory interpretation as to whether or not the 
municipality has acted in a manner consistent with the intent and 
details of the specific delegation. Plaintiffs attacked the ordinance 
on a number of grounds, one being that the city, if acting pursuant 
to its taxing authority, must impose a tax on the entire taxable 
class as designated by the state. According to plaintiffs' argument, 
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the city ordinance, by exempting from taxation all containers made 
of metal, glass, fibre and paper board, should be held invalid as a 
deviation from its delegated authority.64 The defendant city sought 
a liberal construction of the enabling act which would allow it to 
"pick and choose" from the enumerated list of taxable items.65 
Defendant based its argument, in part, on the uniqueness of the 
ecologically-inspired tax which, according to the city, called for an 
exception to the general rule of strict construction of enabling 
legislation. 
The New York Supreme Court found no merit in the city's 
contention and held that, under the Enabling Act, the city did not 
have the right to "pick and choose." Quoting the language of an 
earlier case,66 the court cautioned that (1) the state's exclusive power 
to tax includes" ... the power to determine the class of persons to 
be taxed," and (2) that " ... any taxes imposed by the [City of New 
York] must be within the express limitations ... " of the enabling 
legislation.67 Such enabling acts are to be strictly construed against 
the municipality.68 Treating each type of container material as the 
subject of a separate tax was held to strain " ... the plain meaning 
of the law and contravene the tenet of strict construction of tax 
statu tes. "69 
The court further held that the New York City ordinance ac-
tually defeated the purpose and intent of the Enabling Act by 
reducing the incentive to recycle containers. According to the court, 
creating a tax on just one type of container allowed manufacturers 
to switch from the taxed containers to the exempted containers, 
with no resultant reduction in the volume of containers used or 
any increase in recycling. 70 
An important issue in Plastics Industry is the different approach 
taken by the New York court in interpreting general home rule 
grants, on one hand, and specific enabling legislation on the other. 
The former are given a liberal construction 71 whereas the latter are 
usually given a strict construction.72 The court stated that "[h]ome 
rule principles are simply inapplicable in the determination of the 
scope of delegated local tax powers."73 However, these two positions 
are not necessarily inconsistent. Since all municipal power emanates 
from the state, a municipality should possess only that power the 
state intended to give it. A home rule grant is designed to give the 
locality that power required to deal with local problems. These 
problems often cannot be identified in advance. Therefore, to best 
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advance the legislative purpose in the absence of express language 
to the contrary, this type of delegation should be liberally construed 
consistent with legislative intent. 
On the other hand, a specific enabling act, by nature, is designed 
to delegate power to allow municipalities to cope with specific 
problems. The legislative purpose, in this case, would seem to be 
best served by a more strict construction of the delegating instru-
ment. Here, since the state has already considered the problem, its 
"solution" should be narrowly interpreted. Hence different stan-
dards of interpretation should exist. 
Plastics Industry does not necessarily mean that localities cannot 
"pick and choose" among potentially taxable commodities. But for 
the limitations imposed by the Equal Protection clause,74 there is 
nothing wrong with municipalities' differentiating among products 
in such a manner. The issue is one of statutory interpretation of 
the enabling act under consideration. 
However, Plastics Industry does indicate that municipalities 
must be careful to act within the limits and requirements of a 
state's enabling legislation. To solve a given environmental prob-
lem, a municipality may require authority beyond its general police 
powers. If so, the locality should seek as broad a specific grant as 
possible. Once the state has acted, however, the municipality is 
constrained to act pursuant to the letter and spirit of the state 
enactment. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORDINANCES 
A. Equal Protection 
Environmental legislation is often susceptible to equal protection 
challenge because of alleged unreasonable, arbitrary or invidiously 
discriminatory classifications. Most environmental enactments in-
volve either taxes, regulations, or prohibitions of some activities to 
the exclusion of others. For example: (1) a county or state limits the 
phosphate content in detergents in order to control water pollu-
tion,75 but does not limit any other detergent ingredient; (2) a city 
taxes certain containers at a higher rate than others in an attempt 
to limit solid wastes;76 (3) fines are imposed on a business for smoke 
emissions, but only above a specific level;77 (4) only certain aspects 
of a business believed to relate to the environment are regulated.78 
In each of these cases, some type of discrimination is necessary, such 
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 793 
as a delineation of those activities believed to be dangerous to the 
environment from those assumed to be non-hazardous. 
The basic principles of the equal protection doctrine are well 
established: any state or municipal legislative classification must be 
a rational one, bearing a reasonable relationship to a proper legis-
lative purpose. The application of this principle, and the guidelines 
used in determining reasonableness and proper legislative purpose, 
are dependent on the specific factual situation, legislation, and 
jurisdiction involved. 
In American Can v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission,79 
plaintiffs challenged a state statute which imposed a greater tax on 
non-reusable beverage containers than it did on those containers 
certified reusable and prohibited the sale of any containers employ-
ing pull top openers.80 The stated purpose of the act was to promote 
the use of reusable beverage containers of a uniform design and to 
facilitate the return of these containers to the manufacturer for 
reuse.81 Plaintiffs urged that the Act created unreasonable, arbitrary 
and constitutionally prohibited classifications that were invidiously 
discriminatory and devoid of any rational relationship when viewed 
in light of the Act's stated purpose. 
The A merican Can court stated the traditional standards for the 
review of equal protection challenges, that there is a strong pre-
sumption of the validity of a legislature enactment82 and that, in the 
absence of infringement of specially protected rights,83 this pre-
sumption of legislative validity may be overcome only by a con-
clusive showing of arbitrariness.84 The court held that the Act was 
not a violation of equal protection "[b]ecause the Oregon State 
Legislature could have concluded and did conclude that there was, 
in fact, a rational relationship between the classifications in the Act 
and the legislative purposes."85 
Inherent in their conclusion of constitutionality was the finding 
that the stated purpose-the promotion of reusable containers-
was a legitimate state concern. The court upheld without explana-
tion the reasonableness of the legislature's relating of the classifica-
tions to the purpose. The legislation is arguably reasonable: the 
state's police power includes the protection of the health, safety 
and welfare of its inhabitants; this concern extends to the control of 
environmental and health hazards such as increased, nondisposable 
solid wastes; this in turn leads to the need to control the production 
of excess containers and the need for reusable containers; a law 
taxing the use of such reusable containers is one rational way of 
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exerClsmg such control and is therefore reasonable. The court 
further points out that the" ... Act is invulnerable to plaintiff's ... 
constitutional attack ... regardless of whether the Court believes 
that the Act or policy behind the Act to be wise or whether experts 
agree or disagree as to the results which might be reasonably antici-
pated by the Act."86 
The court further held, relative to the question of reasonableness 
and rational basis, that "[t]he legislature is simply not required to 
legislate upon all possible litter problems or to attempt to solve the 
State's entire solid waste problem in one statute."87 The American 
Can court found support for its decision in Anchor Hocking Glass 
Corp. v. Barber88 which upheld the constitutionality of a Vermont 
statute prohibiting the sale of malt products in reusable glass con-
tainers even though there was litter other than beer bottles not 
subject to state sanction. The Vermont court noted that: 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
prohibit legislative classification, and the imposition of statutory re-
straints which are not imposed on another. ... A particular classifica-
tion is not invalidated by the Fourteenth Amendment merely because 
inequalities actually result. Every classification ... produces inequali-
ties in some degree; but the law is not thereby rendered invalid ... 
unless the inequality produced be actually and palpably unreasonable 
and arbitrary.89 
The court in A merican Can asserted that Society of Plastics I n-
dustry v. New York City!lO was contrary.91 In Plastics Industry the 
New York City tax on plastic containers-without a similar tax on 
paperboard, glass, fiber and metal containers-was found to con-
travene state92 and federal equal protection. After considering pos-
sible differences among the container types, the Plastics Industry 
court stated that it " ... perceives no obvious distinction between 
plastic containers and all other types."U3 Therefore, it held that the 
classification did not bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose 
stated, the promotion of container recycling and the reduction of 
solid waste disposal costs. In declaring the New York City tax an 
unconstitutional denial of equal protection, the court was particu-
larly impressed by the argument that the tax on plastics, rather than 
promoting recycling efforts, merely provides an incentive to switch 
from plastic containers to a tax exempt type, with no resulting 
ecological benefi t.!l4 
At first reading, Plastics Industry does appear to conflict with 
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American Can and Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. The later cases 
held that inequities which are inherent in all classifications were 
not, in and of themselves, sufficient to invalidate the statute chal-
lenged. Yet, the Plastics Industry court did not allow the city the 
" ... right first to tryout [the tax] ... with respect to one of the 
authorized types of containers ... "95 by holding that the similarity 
between plastic and other container materials raised inequities suf-
ficient to make the classification unreasonable. In this regard, the 
Plastics Industry court rejected defendant's contention that any 
justification for separate treatment of plastic containers should be 
sufficient to justify the ordinance,96 a contention that seems to have 
been accepted by the court in A merican Can. 
However, the factual and legal situations in A merican Can and 
Plastics Industry can be sufficiently distinguished so that their hold-
ings need not be considered inconsistent. 
The first distinction, one of fact, revolves about the reasonable-
ness of taxing only plastic containers. In considering this question, 
it is assumed that there is no threshold question of the sufficiency of 
authorized power to legislate. Even with the broad legislative dis-
cretion and judicial restraint evident in A merican Can) an enact-
ment will be held to violate equal protection if its classifications are 
unreasonable and arbitrary. Following the reasoning of the Plastics 
Industry court, the ordinance would probably have failed even 
under the A merican Can standard since it was seemingly unable to 
further the purpose of the enabling legislation. Glass, metal, fiber, 
paperboard and plastic, when used as container material, are all, to 
a great extent, interchangeable. As stated by the court, the ordi-
nance, rather than helping to solve the solid waste problem, would 
simply encourage the use of equally as harmful non-plastic con-
tainers.97 A finding of palpable unreasonableness may therefore be 
justified in Plastics Industry but not in A merican Can. Such hold-
ings are not necessarily inconsistent but simply factually distin-
guishable. 
The second distinction, concerning the legislative postures of the 
state statute in American Can and the municipal ordinance in 
Plastics Industry) provides another ground for distinguishing the 
cases, independent of any absolute determination of the reasonable-
ness of the tax on plastics alone. In Plastics Industry) the municipal-
ity was held to have acted in excess of its delegated authority. On 
the other hand the Oregon legislature in A merican Can was held 
to have acted within the scope of its authority.98 The American Can 
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court hesitated to weigh the effectiveness of the statute stating that 
" ... Courts should not sit as some kind of a super legislature to 
review the wisdom of the laws enacted .... "99 The court accorded 
the state wide discretion precisely because it possessed the authority 
to act. New York City, on the other hand, did not possess this 
authority and was held to have acted contrary to the intent of the 
state's delegation. The state, through its enabling legislation, had 
already decided on a system of classification it deemed reasonable. 
Applying the rationale of American Can to Plastics Industry would 
lead a court to restrain itself from analyzing an act's effectiveness, 
and, in the absence of constitutional limitations, to give support to 
the determination of the superior legislative body.loO The Enabling 
Act is presumed to present a standard of reasonableness. The city, 
acting contrary to that standard, is deemed to have acted unreason-
ably. Although the Plastics Industry court did not explicitly justify 
its finding of an equal protection violation based on this reasoning, 
much of the court's discussion of reasonableness contains references 
to the state's objectives and the specific provisions of the Enabling 
Act itelf. 
In summary, states and their political subdivisions are given con-
siderable legislative discretion relative to the question of reason-
ableness of classifications. The action taken by the locality must 
nevertheless conform within the constitutional limitations of rea-
sonableness and non-arbitrariness. 
B. Due Process 
Environmental ordinances are also often susceptible to due 
process challenge. Most environmental legislation adversely effects 
an individual's or a group's property rights. Such adverse effects 
are, without more, insufficient to invalidate a municipal ordinance 
on due process grounds. A municipality in the exercise of its police 
power is free to adopt a policy reasonably related to promote the 
public welfare, and to enforce that police by legislation adopted to 
its purpose. lOl The test of due process is essentially a balancing test, 
weighing community need against harm to the individuapo2 There-
fore due process, although it sets constitutional requirements of 
reasonableness, nonarbitrariness and definiteness on ordinances, 
" ... does not make a [municipality] impotent to guard its citizens 
against the annoyance of life [just] because the regulations may 
restrict the manner of doing a legitimate business."lo3 
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The court in A merican Can upheld the validity of the dispropor-
tionate Oregon tax on non-reusable containers against a due process 
challenge. The purpose of the tax was to promote the use of reus-
able beverage containers and to facilitate the return of such reusable 
containers to the manufacturers for reusage. 104 The court held that 
this was indeed a legitimate and proper governmental concern and 
that the Act's provisions" ... show on their face that they bear a 
rational relationship to the purposes for which the Act was en-
acted. "105 
A similar result was reached in Turnpike Realty Company, Inc. 
v. Town of Dedham.106 Here, a zoning by-law was amended so as to 
restrict the use of petitioner's land by designating it as a Flood Plan 
District. The Turnpike Realty court held that the evidence indi-
cated that there was a reasonable purpose supporting the town's 
action, the attempted control of seasonal or periodic flooding. In 
upholding the town's action the Turnpike Realty court emphasized 
that " ... although it is clear that petitioner is substantially re-
stricted in the use of its land, such restrictions must be balanced 
against the potential harm to the community."107 
An example of a successful due process challenge is to be found 
in Society of Plastics Industry v. New York City.108 In addition to 
being held invalid as in excess of delegated authority and as a viola-
tion of equal protection, the Plastics Industry court held the New 
York City tax on plastics to be a violation of the due process clauses 
of both the state and federal constitutions. The court emphasized 
the fact that " [a] statute which interferes with or takes away a 
person's property must be reasonably calculated to accomplish some 
proper public purpose."109 The court found that the tax did not 
accomplish a proper public purpose. The tax's purpose was to 
promote the recycling of plastic containers and to reduce the cost 
of solid waste disposal, yet its affect might have been to encourage 
the use of equally damaging non plastic containers.11o The ordinance 
was therefore held to violate due process in that " ... [t]he actual 
result of the law ... is the destruction of an industry to the benefit 
of its competitors without proof of any legitimate public reasons 
therefore." 111 
C. Federal Preemption: The Commerce Clause 
The federal constitution requires that a state statute or municipal 
ordinance must not conflict with federal law. ll2 The question of 
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federal preemption is a recurring one with respect to environmental 
ordinances. For example, the expansive concept of interstate com-
merce has tended to classify as interstate many activities otherwise 
thought of as essentially local in natureya Of fundamental local 
concern, then, is the question of whether a state or municipality can 
regulate an activity even though it relates to the preempted area of 
interstate commerce. This issue of federal preemption is often 
raised as the result of specific Congressional action. 
Although federal power of interstate commerce may be pervasive, 
it is not, per seJ exclusive. Conflict is not created solely by virtue of 
the overlapping of local and federal provisions. Conflicts result only 
from local action actually preempted by the federal government. 
Congress often expresses its intent to preempt an area by stating so 
explicitly. More difficult issues present themselves when Congress 
remains silent on the issue of preemption. The courts attempt to 
interpret the probable Congressional intent by considering such 
factors as the nature and extent of any conflicting provisions in local 
and federal enactments, the need for a uniform national policy, and 
the elaborateness of federal control in the given area. 
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroitll4 is a landmark 
case concerning the validity of local pollution control ordinances 
in the presence of existing federal regulations. Here, the constitu-
tional validity of Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code as applied to 
ships operated in interstate commerce was challenged. The ship's 
boilers had been approved by the United States Coast Guard in 
accordance with a comprehensive system of federal regulations. The 
United States Supreme Court, in sustaining the Detroit Smoke 
Abatement Code, as applied to ships' boilers, held in part that: 
Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people 
breathe clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional 
concept of ... police power. In the exercise of that power the states 
and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of interstate com-
merce ... concurrently with the federal government.115 
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking to the issue of federal preemption, 
stated that federal intent to supersede state action is not to be in-
ferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe 
its regulation but that the purpose and effect of the legislation must 
be considered. The court distinguished the purposes of the respec-
tive acts-seagoing safety in the case of the federal inspection stat-
ute and local health protection in the case of the ordinance. The 
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court, applying the various tests delineated supra to ascertain the 
Congressional intent, upheld the validity of the ordinance noting 
that " ... State regulation, based on police power, which does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its 
required uniformity, may constitutionally stand."116 
The spirit and philosophy of Huron is evident in Soap and De-
tergent Association v. Clark.1l7 Here, a Dade County, Florida ordi-
nance that banned all phosphates in detergents and required 
detergent labels to list all ingredients was held valid despite a 
commerce clause attack. The decision held water pollution to be 
a legitimate concern affecting the health, safety and welfare of local 
citizens and held that the burden on interstate commerce was in-
sufficient to hold the measure violative of the commerce clauseYs 
Had the burden been such as to essentially curtail interstate com-
merce, or had the county discriminated in favor of Florida deter-
gents in an arbitrary manner, the ordinance would have been 
unconstitutional. Similar results can be found in other recent envi-
ronmental cases including Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Erie County,1l9 
American Can v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 120 and So-
ciety of Plastics Industry v. New York City.l2l 
These cases indicate that the doctrine of federal supremacy does 
not preclude state and local governments from protecting the 
health, welfare and safety of their citizens by actions which affect 
interstate commerce only tangentially. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One effective way of protecting the environment is through local 
action. Localities, in order to most efficaciously meet their ecolog-
ical responsibility must be aware of the inherent limitations to 
their authority. Recognition of the boundaries of their authority 
will permit local governments to (1) more effectively draft legisla-
tion and (2) determine when state and federal legislation control. 
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